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punishment be authorized by a preexisting penal statute and ordered by a
lawful judicial sentence. Today, prison administrators impose solitary
confinement on thousands of prisoners despite the fact that neither of these
requirements has been met. Is this imposition a “punishment without law,”
or is it a mere exercise of administrative discretion? In an 1890 case called
In re Medley, the Supreme Court held that solitary confinement is a separate
punishment subject to constitutional restraints, but it has ignored this holding
in recent decades, treating the imposition of solitary confinement as though
it were a mere act of administrative discretion. This Essay asks whether the
Medley Court or the modern Court is correct as a matter of constitutional law
and concludes that the Medley Court is correct.
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INTRODUCTION
Nulla poena sine lege—no punishment without law—is one of the
oldest and most universally accepted principles of English and American
law.1 Today, prison administrators place thousands of American prisoners in
long-term solitary confinement2 despite the fact that such placement is
authorized neither by penal statute nor by judicial sentence.3 Is solitary
confinement “punishment without law,” or is it a mere exercise of
administrative discretion?
Imagine a prisoner is present during a violent altercation in the prison
yard. The warden suspects that the prisoner was an instigator of the fight,
and orders that the prisoner be publicly flogged to deter both this prisoner
1
See, e.g., Jerome Hall, Nulla Poena Sine Lege, 47 YALE L.J. 165 (1937) (tracing the historical roots
of the principle).
2
See THE ASS’N OF STATE CORR. ADM’RS & THE LIMAN CTR. FOR PUB. INTEREST LAW, REFORMING
RESTRICTIVE HOUSING: THE 2018 ASCA-LIMAN NATIONWIDE SURVEY OF TIME-IN-CELL 4, 14 (2018)
[hereinafter REFORMING RESTRICTIVE HOUSING] (estimating that 60,000 prisoners are currently kept in
solitary confinement, of whom approximately 7,700 have spent a year or more in solitary confinement
and nearly 2,000 have spent six years or more in solitary confinement).
3
See Alexander A. Reinert, Solitary Troubles, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 927, 959–60 (2018). A
number of states have enacted statutes that purport to authorize prison administrators to impose solitary
confinement on those who break prison rules. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 641.18 (West 2008)
(allowing imposition of solitary confinement “[w]hen any prisoner is unruly or disobeys any regulation
for the management of jails”). If solitary confinement is a punishment for constitutional purposes,
however, such statutory authorizations are invalid because they permit punishment without
constitutionally mandated procedures such as a jury trial. See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S.
228 (1896) (holding that the use of summary procedure before imposing sentence of imprisonment at
hard labor is unconstitutional).
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and others from engaging in future acts of violence. Is this flogging a
punishment?
Now imagine a slightly different scenario. A federal judge sentences a
gang member to the statutory maximum sentence of five years in prison and
a $250,000 fine for illegally growing twenty-five marijuana plants. When the
offender arrives at prison, the warden informs him that he will add one day
to the prisoner’s sentence for every day the prisoner fails to identify the other
gang members he knows in the prison. As a result, the offender spends an
extra five years in prison. Is this additional prison time a punishment?
Now imagine a third scenario. Imagine that instead of a flogging or
extra prison time, the warden transfers the prisoner to a higher security
facility to minimize the risk of violence or gang activity. As a result, the
prisoner suffers greater restrictions on his liberty and experiences more
discomfort than he would in a lower security facility. Is this transfer a
punishment?
Many of us would probably consider the first two scenarios to be clear
examples of punishment, but we might not be so sure about the third. In all
three cases, a government official inflicts additional pain or imposes
additional restrictions on a prisoner’s liberty. In all three cases, the official’s
actions are motivated by a desire to enhance prison security. The third
scenario seems, on its face, less extreme than the other two—so we might
think of it as a mere administrative measure rather than an additional
punishment.4 But before deciding, we might want to know more about
conditions at the new facility. If they are sufficiently harsh, the reassignment
might also start to look like an additional punishment.
These examples illustrate two things. First, the most important factor in
determining the line between punishments and nonpunishments, at least
intuitively, is penal effect. Flogging and extension of a prison sentence are
new punishments because they inflict pain or restrict liberty well beyond
what was authorized by the original sentence. The fact that the warden’s
purpose might be characterized as “regulatory” rather than “penal” is not
enough to transform these punishments into mere administrative acts.
Second, although prison officials need discretion to protect guards and
inmates from prison violence, this discretion does not include the power to
impose new punishments beyond what was authorized by the offender’s

4
See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) (“Confinement in any of the State’s institutions
is within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose.”).
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sentence.5 Otherwise, prison officials would have the authority to do what
legislatures, judges, and juries may not: Impose punishment without law.6
The government’s authority to impose punishments is limited by
several constitutional provisions. The Ex Post Facto Clauses of Article I,
Sections Nine and Ten prohibit the government from increasing an
offender’s punishment after he commits a crime.7 The Fifth Amendment’s8
Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits punishing an offender twice for the same
offense, and its Compelled Self-Incrimination Clause prohibits the use of
punishment as coercion to obtain incriminating information from an
individual.9 The Sixth Amendment prohibits punishment for conduct that is
not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.10 And of course, the Eighth
Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishments.11 If flogging,
extending a prison sentence, or transferring a prisoner to a higher security
facility constitutes punishment, then prison officials may not inflict it unless
it was both authorized by the penal statute governing the offense of
conviction at the time the prisoner committed the offense and imposed by
the sentence actually given by a judge or jury. Moreover, the Fifth and Eighth
5

See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
7
U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9–10.
8
Id. amend. V.
9
The Supreme Court has sometimes implied that government coercion can only be considered a
“punishment” if it is inflicted as the result of a criminal conviction. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977) (holding that paddling of schoolchildren did not come within scope of Eighth
Amendment because “[a]n examination of the history of the Amendment and the decisions of this Court
construing the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment confirms that it was designed to protect
those convicted of crimes”). Early constitutional history suggests, however, that the term “punishment”
was also thought to encompass practices such as pretrial torture, where pain was inflicted in order to
obtain information. For example, during the Virginia ratification debate, George Mason, the principal
drafter of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, asserted the following reasons for concluding that that
document prohibited pretrial torture: “[F]or that one clause expressly provided that no man can give
evidence against himself; and that the worthy gentleman must know that, in those countries where torture
is used, evidence was extorted from the criminal himself. Another clause of the bill of rights provided
that no cruel and unusual punishments shall be inflicted; therefore, torture was included in the
prohibition.” 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT
PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 452 (2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES]. Similarly, Blackstone
described pretrial torture as a “punishment.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 325–27 (16th ed. 1825); see also Celia Rumann, Tortured History: Finding Our Way Back
to the Lost Origins of the Eighth Amendment, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 661, 673 (2004) (discussing historical
evidence that the Eighth Amendment was originally understood to prohibit torture).
10
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (“Other
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
11
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
6
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Amendments may bar certain punishments altogether, either because they
involve an effort to force the prisoner to provide incriminating evidence or
because they are cruel and unusual.12
These limits apply to all three branches of government. Indeed, they
arguably should apply with greatest force to the executive branch because it
has strong incentives to order the infliction of punishments, but no
independent constitutional authority to do so. Basic separation of powers
principles dictate that only the legislature may authorize punishments and
only the judge or the jury may impose them. Executive officials are supposed
to implement the punishments authorized by the other branches of
government. They do not have the authority to enhance punishments on their
own.13 At the same time, executive officials interact with individuals more
frequently and directly than representatives of the other branches of
government and have strong incentives to use punishment to exert control
over them. Thus, it is important to make sure that executive officials comply
with the constitutional provisions summarized above.
The Supreme Court’s modern prison conditions jurisprudence shows
little awareness of the separation of powers principles prohibiting executive
officials from imposing punishments on their own authority.14 Instead, the
Court has focused on a different separation of powers problem: the need to
prevent the judiciary from involving itself in the running of prisons. To
decide constitutional cases without intruding upon the prerogatives of the
other branches of government, courts need a judicially administrable
standard of adjudication. As discussed in Part I below, the Supreme Court’s
modern punishment-related jurisprudence notably lacks such a standard. The
tests the Court employs for distinguishing punishments from
nonpunishments are so vague and ambiguous that they provide little real
guidance. Thus, the Court must either substitute its own judgment for that of
prison officials or defer to prison officials’ constitutionally questionable
12
Because prison conditions are part of the punishment the offender receives with his sentence, the
Eighth Amendment applies to the conditions even if the decision to place a prisoner in a certain facility
does not constitute a separate punishment above and beyond the prisoner’s formal sentence. See, e.g.,
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–06 (1976) (applying the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to
prison conditions); see also John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Cruel,” 105 GEO. L.J. 441
(2017) [hereinafter Stinneford, Original Meaning of “Cruel”] (discussing the Supreme Court’s prisonconditions jurisprudence under the Eighth Amendment). Professor Judith Resnik has recently identified
a nascent “anti-ruination principle” tying together the various strands of the Supreme Court’s Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence over the past seventy years, including its prison-conditions case law. See
Judith Resnik, (Un)Constitutional Punishments: Eighth Amendment Silos, Penological Purposes, and
People’s “Ruin,” 129 YALE L.J.F. 365, 408 (2020).
13
See supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text.
14
See infra Part I.
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conduct. In other words, in the absence of a clear, workable standard of
adjudication, the Court must either violate separation of powers by taking
over the functions of the Executive or tolerate the Executive’s violation of
separation of powers by deferring to its decisions to inflict punishments on
the basis of its own authority. Such tolerance also permits prison officials to
violate individuals’ rights by imposing punishments without law.
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has chosen to tolerate punishment
by executive fiat. The Court has implied that once a prisoner is incarcerated,
changes to prison conditions will not be considered punishments unless they
are cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment—a situation that is only
triggered, under current case law, by proof that the responsible prison official
had a culpable state of mind.15 Even if conditions of confinement impose a
“significant and atypical hardship” on the prisoner, they are not considered
punishments and therefore trigger only minimal due process protection.16
The Court’s deference to administrative discretion means that executive
officials can easily evade constitutional restrictions on the infliction of
punishment.
An examination of English and American constitutional history
demonstrates three facts that are relevant to this situation. First, the need to
limit the government’s discretion over punishment has been a central theme
of English and American constitutionalism from the Magna Carta through
the adoption of the American Bill of Rights. Second, executive officials’
exercise of undue discretion over punishment has been recognized for
centuries as a central attribute of arbitrary and tyrannical government. Third,
the core standard for distinguishing between punishments and
nonpunishments is penal effect viewed in light of tradition. If a government
action has traditionally been used as a punishment or imposes pain or
deprivation equivalent to a method traditionally used as a punishment, it is a
punishment for constitutional purposes regardless of the label the
government attaches to it.17
15

See infra Part I.
See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223 (2005); see also infra Section I.B. Moving the
analysis from the “punishment” question to the “due process” question has not solved the problem arising
from the Court’s lack of an administrable standard for differentiating punishments from nonpunishments,
for the Court also lacks an administrable standard for determining which inflictions of pain or deprivations
of liberty within prison trigger due process protection. See, e.g., Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223 (noting the
courts lack a “baseline from which to measure what [deprivation] is atypical and significant in any
particular prison system”).
17
This is not to say that the reasons for the imposition are unimportant. If the government imposes a
deprivation that has traditionally been used for nonpenal as well as penal reasons, the purpose of the
deprivation may tell us whether or not the deprivation is punishment. For example, denial of the right to
practice law has traditionally been imposed for nonpenal reasons—failure to pass the bar exam, failure to
16

14

115:9 (2020)

Is Solitary Confinement a Punishment?

The Supreme Court’s older case law reflects these principles. In 1890,
the Court held, in a case called In re Medley,18 that the transfer of a
condemned offender from a county jail to solitary confinement in a
penitentiary prior to execution was a new punishment for constitutional
purposes. The Court reached this conclusion for two related reasons: solitary
confinement was historically used as a heightened form of punishment, and
it inflicted substantial suffering beyond what is normally imposed by a prison
sentence.19 The fact that the government’s purpose in imposing solitary
confinement on Medley was regulatory rather than penal was irrelevant to
the Court’s analysis. Medley is still good law and answers the question posed
by this Essay: Solitary confinement is a punishment—not a mere exercise of
administrative discretion—and is thus subject to the constitutional
constraints listed above.
Part I describes the Supreme Court’s existing case law governing prison
officials’ discretion to impose harsher conditions on inmates. Part II analyzes
English and American constitutional history relating to the need to limit
discretion over punishment, the danger of executive discretion in the
infliction of punishment, and the distillation of a standard relevant to
conditions of confinement. Finally, Part III checks the accuracy of the
Supreme Court’s conclusion in Medley that the harshness of solitary
confinement makes it a new punishment by examining historical and modern
empirical data relating to the effects of solitary confinement and concludes
that the Medley Court was correct.
I.

THE DOMINANCE OF DISCRETION: CURRENT APPROACHES TO
PUNISHMENT AND DUE PROCESS

Current Supreme Court doctrine governing conditions of confinement
focuses almost exclusively on the need to respect the discretionary decisions
of prison officials and focuses little on the need to constrain this discretion
by law. This deferential approach stems from the Court’s failure to identify
a workable, coherent definition of “punishment,” which has led to an

meet character and fitness requirements, etc. But if the government imposes this deprivation in order to
punish a person for prior conduct, it is a punishment for constitutional purposes. See Ex parte Garland,
71 U.S. 333, 377 (1867). The government’s purpose is also important in determining whether a
punishment is justified and proportionate to the offense. See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison
Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?,
89 MINN. L. REV. 571 (2005); Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment,
91 VA. L. REV. 677 (2005); John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899 (2011) [hereinafter Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality].
18
134 U.S. 160 (1890).
19
Id. at 173.
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inability to develop a standard to differentiate permissible from
impermissible exercises of discretion over conditions of confinement.
A. The Supreme Court’s Failure to Define “Punishment”
The Supreme Court has not adopted a clear, consistent standard for
determining whether conditions imposed by prison officials constitute an
additional punishment beyond what has been authorized by penal statute and
judicial sentence. Instead, it has adopted at least two different standards, one
of which is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the Constitution’s text,
and the other of which is largely incoherent.
The Court’s first definition of punishment, which it employs in Eighth
Amendment cases, comes from its decision in Wilson v. Seiter.20 In that case,
a prisoner brought a lawsuit claiming that certain prison conditions—namely
“overcrowding, excessive noise, insufficient locker storage space,
inadequate heating and cooling, improper ventilation, unclean and
inadequate restrooms, unsanitary dining facilities and food preparation, and
housing with mentally and physically ill inmates”21—constituted cruel and
unusual punishment. The Supreme Court held that such conditions amount
to a punishment only if the prison official responsible for them displayed a
“wanton” or “culpable” state of mind.22 Such wantonness or culpability could
be shown by establishing a prison official’s “deliberate indifference”23 to a
prisoner’s well-being, or that the official acted “maliciously and sadistically
for the very purpose of causing harm.”24
The requirement that responsible prison officials must be shown to have
a culpable state of mind might make sense as a standard for determining
which punishments are “cruel,”25 but not as a means of distinguishing
punishments from nonpunishments. Indeed, this standard seems flatly
inconsistent with the plain meaning of the word “punishment.” Webster’s
1828 dictionary, for example, defines “punishment” as “[a]ny pain or
suffering inflicted on a person for a crime or offense, by the authority to
which the offender is subject, either by the constitution of God or of civil
20

501 U.S. 294 (1991).
Id. at 296.
22
Id. at 299, 302, 305 (emphasis omitted).
23
Id. at 302 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
24
Id. (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986)).
25
As I have demonstrated elsewhere, however, this would be an incorrect standard as a matter of
original meaning. See Stinneford, Original Meaning of “Cruel,” supra note 12; see also Samuel L. Bray,
“Necessary AND Proper” and “Cruel AND Unusual”: Hendiadys in the Constitution, 102 VA. L. REV.
687, 717 (2016) (arguing that “cruel and unusual” is a hendiadys—that is, a multiword phrase with a
single, complex meaning—but agreeing that it does not refer to the mental state of the punisher).
21
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society.”26 Similarly, Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary defines
punishment, in relevant part, as “suffering, pain, or loss that serves as
retribution,” “a penalty inflicted on an offender through judicial procedure,”
or “severe, rough, or disastrous treatment.”27 As these older and newer
dictionary definitions imply, punishment involves intent to inflict pain or
suffering, but not necessarily culpable intent. Moreover, once we consider
punishment outside the context of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, the culpability requirement loses even its surface appeal. What does
a government official’s culpability have to do with the question of whether
a prisoner is suffering an ex post facto punishment, or double jeopardy, or
deprivation of the right to a jury trial?
The other test the Court sometimes uses to distinguish punishments
from nonpunishments was first articulated in Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez,28 and was applied to prison conditions for pretrial detainees in Bell
v. Wolfish29 and United States v. Salerno.30 The question in MendozaMartinez was whether a statute that stripped citizenship from certain draft
dodgers imposed a punishment within the meaning of the Constitution.31 To
answer this question, the Court set forth the following multifactor test: (1)
whether the sanction imposes “an affirmative disability or restraint”; (2)
whether the sanction “has historically been regarded as a punishment”; (3)
whether the sanction “comes into play only on a finding of scienter”; (4)
whether the sanction “promote[s] the traditional aims of punishment—
retribution and deterrence”; (5) whether the sanction applies to behavior that
is “already a crime”; (6) whether the sanction is “rationally connected” to a
possible “alternative purpose”; and (7) whether the sanction “appears
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose.”32
This test is confusing and amorphous. The Court does not specify how
the factors relate to each other, nor how they are supposed to reveal whether
a government action is a punishment. Nonetheless, there is an implicit logical
relationship between the test’s seven factors. The first two focus on the
government action itself: Does the action have a penal effect, and is it the
sort of action that has historically been used as punishment? The remaining
factors focus on the government’s purpose in taking the action: Is it directed
26
2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New York, S.
Converse 1828).
27
Punishment, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/punishment?
utm_campaign=sd&utm_medium=serp&utm_source=jsonld [https://perma.cc/DKQ9-579G].
28
372 U.S. 144 (1963).
29
441 U.S. 520 (1979).
30
481 U.S. 739 (1987).
31
372 U.S. at 165–66.
32
Id. at 168–69.
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only at culpable actors? (Factors 3 and 5.) Does the government label the
action as penal or regulatory? (Factors 4 and 6.) If the government labels the
action as regulatory, is this labeling plausible in light of the action’s effect?
(Factors 6 and 7.)
When one examines the precedents underlying the Mendoza-Martinez
factors, it becomes clear that a government-imposed sanction is a
punishment if it has a clear penal effect, and that questions about the
government’s purpose in imposing a sanction only arise when the sanction
is also often used for nonpenal purposes. Every case cited in support of the
factors relating to government purpose (factors 3 through 7) involved a type
of deprivation that has historically been imposed for regulatory purposes.
Seven of the nine cases involved monetary deprivations labeled as taxes,
customs duties, denial of social security benefits, or contractual liquidated
damages provisions.33 The two remaining cases involved “status”
deprivations—disqualification from public office34 and denationalization35—
that are often imposed for regulatory purposes. States routinely impose
regulatory requirements that must be met before a person can hold public
office, and the exclusion of those who fail to meet these requirements is not
generally regarded as a punishment. Similarly, as a plurality of the Supreme
Court noted in Trop v. Dulles, the federal government generally
denaturalizes citizens who falsified their citizenship applications “not . . . to
penalize the alien for having falsified his application for citizenship” but “in
the exercise of the power to make rules for the naturalization of aliens.”36
It is not a coincidence that the precedents supporting factors 3 through
7 involve deprivations that have historically been imposed for regulatory
purposes. In order to determine whether such a deprivation is actually a
punishment, the Court must consider evidence that the deprivation’s true
purpose is not what it appears to be. Factors 3 through 7 identify the kinds
of evidence relevant to this inquiry. But if the deprivation is of the sort that
has historically been imposed as punishment, there is no need to look for
evidence of purpose. The penal effect itself is sufficient to qualify the

33
See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (termination of social security benefits); Rex Trailer
Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956) (contractual liquidated damages provision); United States v.
Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935) (excise tax on liquor); United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931)
(tax on retail liquor business); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922) (“tax” on unlawful liquor sales);
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (child labor tax); Helwig v.
United States, 188 U.S. 605 (1903) (customs charge).
34
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1867).
35
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
36
Id. at 98.
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deprivation as punishment.37 Thus, a court examining whether a governmentimposed deprivation is actually a punishment should engage in a two-step
inquiry. First it should ask whether the action has traditionally been used as
a punishment or imposes pain or deprivation equivalent to a method
traditionally used as a punishment. If the answer to this question is no, the
court should use factors 3 through 7 to determine whether the action has been
imposed for punitive purposes. If the answer is yes, there is no need to
inquire into the government’s purpose.
The Supreme Court in recent decades has generally skipped the first
step of this inquiry and focused solely on evidence relating to a given
sanction’s purpose. The Court has also increasingly deferred to the label the
government attaches to the sanction at the expense of other types of
evidence. For example, in Bell v. Wolfish,38 the Court considered whether
prison conditions such as double-bunking and restrictions on the receipt of
books, food, and other packages counted as unconstitutional punishment of
pretrial detainees. In answering this question, the Court focused almost
exclusively on factor 6: whether there was a rational relationship between
the challenged restrictions on liberty and the asserted nonpunitive purpose
of the restrictions.39 The Court minimized the liberty interest at stake and
emphasized the need to defer to the expertise of prison administrators.
Because detainees were already in prison, and were thus already subject to
intrusions on their privacy and restrictions on their liberty, these increases in
the level of intrusion were not sufficient to raise constitutional concerns.40
Moreover, respect for separation of powers dictated that the Court give
deference to prison officials’ expertise concerning the measures necessary to
preserve security.41 The Supreme Court observed that courts should not be in
the business of running prisons.42 Thus, it concluded that the restrictions
placed on pretrial detainees did not constitute punishment because they were
rationally related to the goal of protecting prison security.43

37
See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (sixty-day imprisonment at hard
labor); In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890) (imposition of solitary confinement). These cases are discussed
in greater depth in Section II.C.
38
441 U.S. 520 (1979).
39
Id. at 538–39.
40
Id. at 546 (“A detainee simply does not possess the full range of freedoms of an unincarcerated
individual.”).
41
Id. at 547 (“Prison administrators . . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption
and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and
discipline and to maintain institutional security.”).
42
See id. at 548.
43
See id. at 555.
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In United States v. Salerno,44 the Supreme Court made its deference to
government labeling more explicit. It asserted that unless the government
labels its action as a punishment, the action will be considered a nonpenal
regulation so long as it has a rational relationship to a nonpenal purpose and
is not excessive in relation to that purpose.45 Thus, it held that pretrial
detention on grounds of dangerousness was not a punishment because
Congress labeled this detention as nonpenal and because such detention was
rationally related to the goal of protecting the community.46 The Supreme
Court later used similar reasoning to hold that indefinite detention of persons
considered sexually dangerous was not a punishment and thus not subject to
the various limits stated in the Constitution.47
B. The Minimal Due Process Approach
As the cases discussed above demonstrate, outside the context of an
Eighth Amendment claim, the Supreme Court strongly defers to the label the
government attaches to a given deprivation or infliction. If the government
labels a sanction as nonpenal, the Court generally accepts the label. The cases
discussed below demonstrate that the Supreme Court will sometimes analyze
these nonpunishments under the Due Process Clause, but only in extreme
cases—and even then, it provides far less procedural and substantive
protection than is required by the constitutional provisions that govern the
infliction of punishment.
The Supreme Court’s reluctance to interfere with prison officials’
decisions concerning conditions of confinement is evident in three cases
involving imposition of solitary confinement: Hutto v. Finney,48 Sandin v.
Conner,49 and Wilkinson v. Austin.50
In Hutto v. Finney,51 the Supreme Court upheld a district court’s
determination that the Arkansas prison system’s use of punitive isolation was
a cruel and unusual punishment.52 The conditions of isolation were
particularly egregious—numerous prisoners were crowded into a single cell

44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
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481 U.S. 739 (1987).
See id. at 747.
Id.
See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 366 (1997).
437 U.S. 678 (1978).
515 U.S. 472 (1995).
545 U.S. 209 (2005).
437 U.S. 678.
Id. at 680–81.
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and subjected to malnourishment and exposure to infectious diseases.53 But
even as the Court condemned these conditions, it implied that prison officials
have the authority to impose long-term solitary confinement so long as they
provide for the physical needs of the offender: “If new conditions of
confinement are not materially different from those affecting other prisoners,
a transfer [to punitive isolation] for the duration of a prisoner’s sentence
might be completely unobjectionable and well within the authority of the
prison administrator.”54
The Supreme Court confirmed prison officials’ discretion to send
prisoners to solitary confinement in Sandin v. Conner.55 In that case, an
inmate named Conner cursed at a prison guard during a highly intrusive strip
search.56 As a result, the prison conducted a disciplinary hearing pursuant to
prison regulations but refused to allow Conner to present witnesses.57 Conner
was sentenced to thirty days of “disciplinary segregation” in solitary
confinement.58 During this period, Conner “had to spend his entire time alone
in his cell (with the exception of 50 minutes each day on average for brief
exercise and shower periods, during which he nonetheless remained isolated
from other inmates and was constrained by leg irons and waist chains).”59 By
contrast, if he had not been placed in disciplinary segregation, Conner
“would have left his cell and worked, taken classes, or mingled with others
for eight hours each day.”60 Thus, Conner argued that the denial of his request
to present witnesses at his disciplinary hearing violated his right to due
process.61
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the government’s purpose in
sending Conner to solitary confinement was “punitive”62 but held that the
Due Process Clause was not implicated because such confinement did not
implicate any “liberty interest.”63 A liberty interest might be implicated if
prison officials impose a constraint that “exceed[s] the sentence in such an
unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause
of its own force”—for example, transfer to a mental hospital or coercive
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

Id. at 682–83.
Id. at 686.
515 U.S. 472 (1995).
Id. at 475.
Id.
Id. at 475–76.
Id. at 494 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 476 (majority opinion).
Id. at 485.
Id. at 486.

21

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

administration of a psychotropic drug.64 Such interests might also be
implicated if the state “create[s]” liberty interests by giving prisoners certain
rights—such as the right to “good time” credits—and then takes them away
from a particular prisoner without adequate procedures.65 But the latter
situation only gives rise to due process concerns if the deprivation “imposes
atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life.”66 The Supreme Court held that the Due Process
Clause did not apply of its own force in this case because “[d]iscipline by
prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct falls within the
expected [parameters] of the sentence imposed by a court of law.”67
Moreover, the Court held, Conner’s sentence to solitary confinement “did
not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State
might conceivably create a liberty interest.”68 This was so because the
conditions of disciplinary segregation “mirrored” those of “administrative
segregation and protective custody” and because inmates in the general
population were confined to their cells for twelve to sixteen hours per day.69
The Supreme Court returned to this question ten years later in Wilkinson
v. Austin.70 That case concerned the procedures necessary to assign a prisoner
to indefinite solitary confinement in a “supermax” facility known as the Ohio
State Penitentiary (OSP).71 As in Conner, prisoners were given notice and an
opportunity to rebut the case against them before being assigned to solitary
confinement, but were not allowed to present their own witnesses.72 Thus,
they claimed that the procedure violated their right to due process.73 The
Court decided that the differences between the indefinite solitary
confinement at issue in this case and the disciplinary segregation at issue in
Conner were sufficient to create “an atypical and significant hardship,” thus
implicating a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause:
For an inmate placed in OSP, almost all human contact is prohibited, even to
the point that conversation is not permitted from cell to cell; the light, though it
may be dimmed, is on for 24 hours; exercise is for 1 hour per day, but only in a
64

See id. at 484 (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980) (transfer to mental hospital);
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990) (coercive administration of a psychotropic drug)).
65
Id. at 477–78 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974)).
66
Id. at 484.
67
Id. at 485.
68
Id. at 486.
69
Id. at 486 & n.8.
70
545 U.S. 209 (2005).
71
Id. at 213.
72
Id. at 216.
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Id. at 218.
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small indoor room. Save perhaps for the especially severe limitations on all
human contact, these conditions likely would apply to most solitary
confinement facilities, but here there are two added components. First is the
duration. Unlike the 30-day placement in [Conner], placement at OSP is
indefinite and, after an initial 30-day review, is reviewed just annually. Second
is that placement disqualifies an otherwise eligible inmate for parole
consideration.74

Nonetheless, as in Conner, the Austin Court upheld the decision to send
the prisoner to indefinite solitary confinement.75 The Court held that
prisoners had a reduced liberty interest because they were already
incarcerated76 and that the State’s interest in security was “dominant”
because of the threat posed by prison gangs.77
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Hutto, Conner, and Austin show that
the Court lacks a meaningful standard for determining whether the
imposition of solitary confinement constitutes an additional punishment or
even a mere deprivation of liberty. The Hutto and Conner decisions imply
that every sentence of incarceration includes authorization to subject
prisoners to solitary confinement.78 The Austin Court expresses some
discomfort with this idea but ultimately affirms prison officials’ broad
authority to impose even indefinite solitary confinement on prisoners.79
These decisions show relatively little awareness of the extreme degree of
additional suffering that solitary confinement inflicts on prisoners. This
suffering will be discussed in Part III.
II. HISTORICAL LIMITS ON PUNISHMENT DISCRETION
This Part provides a brief overview of three aspects of English and
American constitutional history: first, the development of procedural and
substantive doctrines to limit the government’s discretion over the
imposition of punishment and thus minimize the risk of punishment without
law; second, recognition of the dangers to liberty that arise from executive
discretion over punishment; and third, the distillation in the nineteenth
century of a standard for differentiating punishments from nonpunishments,
focusing on penal effect in light of tradition.
74

Id. at 223–24.
Id. at 213.
76
Id. at 225.
77
Id. at 227 (“Prison security, imperiled by the brutal reality of prison gangs, provides the backdrop
of the State’s interest. Clandestine, organized, fueled by race-based hostility, and committed to fear and
violence as a means of disciplining their own members and their rivals, gangs seek nothing less than to
control prison life and to extend their power outside prison walls.”).
78
See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485–86 (1995); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686 (1978).
79
See 545 U.S. at 213, 225–27.
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A. Constitutional Doctrines Limiting Punishment Discretion
Of all governmental powers, the power to punish may be the most
susceptible to abuse. If one wishes to enhance one’s power, eliminate one’s
enemies, or simply demonstrate that one is in control, the easiest and most
straightforward way to accomplish these goals is often the whip, the prison,
or the gallows. For this reason, much of English constitutional history can be
seen as a struggle between a power holder (whether it be king, judge, or
Parliament) seeking to exercise unconstrained power to punish and others
seeking to enforce common law limits on this power. These discretionconstraining common law doctrines were later adopted by the drafters of the
United States Constitution and written into its original text or the Bill of
Rights. Because I have limited space, I will provide only a brief overview of
these principles and doctrines.
English common law doctrines enforcing the nulla poena principle
were both substantive and procedural in nature. They are addressed in turn
below.
1.

No Punishment for Conduct Not Prohibited by Law at the
Time It Occurred
In England, the nulla poena principle dates back at least to Magna
Carta. The thirteenth-century conflicts between King John and his barons led
to a settlement in which he agreed to abide by customary limits on royal
power, including the famous promise: “No Free-man shall be taken, or
imprisoned, or dispossessed, of his free tenement, or liberties, or free
customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or in any way destroyed; nor will we
condemn him, nor will we commit him to prison, excepting by the legal
judgment of his peers, or by the laws of the land.”80 This promise reflected
the idea that the king’s power to punish was limited by law. By the
seventeenth century, common law thinkers like Edward Coke identified this

80
The Third Great Charter of King Henry the Third (Richard Thomson trans., 1829) (1225),
reprinted in THE ROOTS OF LIBERTY: MAGNA CARTA, ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, AND THE ANGLOAMERICAN TRADITION OF RULE OF LAW 335, 347–48 (Ellis Sandoz ed., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2008). The
full text of the provision in the original Latin is “nullus liber homo decetero capiatur vel imprisonetur aut
disseisiatur de aliquo libero tenemento suo vel libertatibus vel liberis consuetudinibus suis, aut utlagetur,
aut exuletur aut aliquo alio modo destruatur, nec super eum ibimus, nec super eum mittemus, nisi per
legale judicium parium suorum, vel per legem terre.” Id. at 340 (emphasis omitted); see also Claire Breay
& Julian Harrison, Magna Carta in Context, BRITISH LIBRARY (July 28, 2014), https://www.bl.uk/magnacarta/articles/magna-carta-in-context [https://perma.cc/7VHA-C6XJ] (describing historical and legal
issues that gave rise to the Magna Carta).
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passage from Magna Carta as the source of the requirement that life, liberty,
or property could not be taken without due process.81
The idea that the government may not inflict punishment for conduct
that does not violate preexisting law is reflected in the traditional common
law prohibition of ex post facto punishments.82 English rulers did not always
honor this principle, of course, but when they violated it they were ultimately
condemned as acting unconstitutionally. For example, English monarchs
created prerogative courts, such as the Court of Star Chamber, in part to
evade procedural and substantive limits to government power generally
respected by common law courts.83 The Court of Star Chamber’s penchant
for punishing those who had not violated preexisting law led Parliament not
only to abolish it but to condemn it on the ground that it had “undertaken to
punish where no law doth warrant, and to make decrees for things having no
such authority, and to inflict heavier punishments than by any law is
warranted . . . . [Such judgment had proven] to be an intolerable burden to
the subjects, and the means to introduce an arbitrary power and
government.”84
Notice that in this statute, Parliament criticizes the Court of Star
Chamber not only for violating substantive rights, but also for ignoring
structural limits to its own power. The Court of Star Chamber abused its
power by inflicting punishments either unauthorized by law or heavier than
authorized by law, and also by issuing decrees it had no authority to issue.
This statute was later interpreted as condemning the court’s refusal to follow
established common law procedures designed to protect the rights of
defendants and as requiring that any new courts of justice established by the
king “must proceed according to the old established forms of the common

81
See EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 50 (6th
ed. 1681).
82
The prohibition of ex post facto punishments is reflected in a story recounted by Blackstone
concerning the Russian ambassador to England during the reign of Queen Anne. The ambassador was
apparently a profligate spender who ran up debts he could not pay back. Ultimately, one of his creditors
had him arrested and imprisoned for debt. When the Czar learned of this, he angrily demanded that the
creditor be executed for his effrontery. “But the queen (to the amazement of that despotic court) directed
her secretary to inform him, ‘that she could inflict no punishment upon any, the meanest, of her subjects,
unless warranted by the law of the land: and, therefore, was persuaded that he would not insist upon
impossibilities.” 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE,
TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 254–55 (1803) [hereinafter 1 TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE].
83
See, e.g., F.W. MAITLAND, SELECTED HISTORICAL ESSAYS OF F.W. MAITLAND 127–30 (Helen M.
Cam ed., 1957).
84
The Habeas Corpus Act 1640, 16 Car. c. 10 (Eng.).
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law.”85 By insisting that the government can only inflict punishments in a
manner that protects substantive rights, follows established procedures, and
respects structural limitations of government power, Parliament sought to
prevent future efforts “to introduce an arbitrary power and government.” 86
2.

No Use of Punishments That Are Harsher than the Common Law
Permits
As noted above, one of the grounds for condemning the Court of Star
Chamber was that it inflicted punishments that were heavier than the law
authorized. Even if the law permits punishment for a given offense, it also
limits the punishments that may be inflicted for that offense. To the extent
punishment exceeds legal limits, it is a punishment without law. This
limitation on government power showed itself in two primary contexts under
the English constitution: the absolute prohibition of torture and the
requirement that punishment be proportionate to the offense.
One of the ways prerogative courts differed from common law courts
was that at least some of them used continental civil law practices such as
torture to extract confessions from criminal defendants.87 From the time
English monarchs first introduced this practice, common lawyers argued that
it was illegal.88 Ultimately, the Court of King’s Bench declared in Felton’s
Case in 1628 that torture was prohibited because “no such punishment is
known or allowed by our law.”89
The requirement that punishment be proportionate to the offense may
be seen in Parliament’s condemnation of the Court of Star Chamber for
inflicting heavier punishments than the law permits for a given offense. It
85

1 TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE, supra note 82, at 142.
The Habeas Corpus Act 1640, 16 Car. c. 10 (Eng.).
87
See, e.g., Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted”: The Original
Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 848 (1969) (describing the Court of High Commission’s use of torture);
see also EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1644),
reprinted in 2 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 944, 1025 (Steve
Sheppard ed., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2003) (claiming that the first step toward introducing civil law judicial
process into England was the placement of a torture device—the rack—in the Tower of London).
88
See, e.g., JOHN FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIAE: A TREATISE IN COMMENDATION OF
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 73 (Francis Gregor trans., Cincinnati, Robert Clarke & Co. 1874) (1470)
(condemning torture as “[a] practice so inhuman deserves not indeed to be called a law, but the high road
to hell”); see also EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 35
(15th ed. 1797) (“[T]here is no law to warrant tortures in this land . . . . And there is no one opinion in
our books[] or judicial[] record (that we have [s]een and remember) for the maintenance of tortures or
torments . . . .”).
89
3 T.B. HOWELL, Proceedings Against John Felton for the Murder of the Duke of Buckingham, in
A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER
CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1783, at 369 (1628).
86
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may be seen even more clearly in the prohibition of excessive fines and cruel
and unusual punishments in the English Bill of Rights. As I have shown
elsewhere, the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments was directed not
only at inherently cruel methods of punishment such as torture, but also at
punishments that are cruelly disproportionate to the offense in light of longstanding prior practice.90
The proportionality requirement may also be seen in rules governing
conditions of confinement while prisoners await trial. Blackstone wrote that
because pretrial prisoners were held “only for safe custody, and not for
punishment,”91 they “ought to be used with the utmost humanity; and neither
be loaded with needless fetters, or subjected to other hardships than such as
are absolutely requisite for the purpose of confinement only.” 92 He lamented,
however, that conditions of confinement “must too often be left to the
discretion of the gaolers[,] who are frequently a merciless race of men, and,
by being conversant in scenes of misery, steeled against any tender
sensation.”93 To protect against abuse of this discretion, Parliament enacted
laws making gaolers liable to punishment for engaging in extortionate or
abusive conduct,94 and for neglecting the health and sanitation of the
prisoners.95 In short, if a restriction on liberty is not itself a punishment, the
jailer must be careful not to inflict greater restrictions or pain than are
necessary, for any additional pain or restriction would be a punishment
without law.
3. Protection of Common Law Procedural Rights
Common law criminal procedures were also designed to prevent the
imposition of wrongful punishment. These procedures included the right to
indictment by grand jury, to jury trial in the vicinage of the offense, to
confront witnesses, and to seek a writ of habeas corpus. Such procedures
limited the power of the government to punish, either by requiring a finding
by citizens that punishment was warranted, or by permitting the defendant to
challenge the basis of the government’s case, or by providing that a judge
may review the lawfulness of a person’s incarceration.
The nulla poena principle was also reflected in jurisdictional rules
designed to limit judicial discretion at sentencing. For example, as
90

Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 17, at 932–38.
4 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 300 (1803) [hereinafter 4 TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE].
92
Id.
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Id.
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Debtors Imprisonment Act 1758, 32 Geo. 2 c. 28, § XI (Eng.).
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Health of Prisoners Act 1774, 14 Geo. 3 c. 59 (Eng.).
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Blackstone explains, courts of equity were prohibited from exercising
jurisdiction in criminal cases because of the risk they would use their
equitable powers to impose more punishment than was permissible by law:
For the freedom of our constitution will not permit, that in criminal cases a
power should be lodged in any judge, to construe the law otherwise than
according to the letter . . . . A man cannot suffer more punishment than the law
assigns, but he may suffer less. The laws cannot be strained by partiality to
inflict a penalty beyond what the letter will warrant; but, in cases where the
letter induces any apparent hardship, the crown has the power to pardon.96

4. Strict Separation of Powers
The common law also required a strict separation of powers in the
imposition and execution of punishments. According to Blackstone, for
example, only a judge could order the execution of a man found guilty of
murder, and he could only do so when acting upon the basis of a lawful
commission.97 The execution order could only be carried out by the proper
officer or his deputy.98 Finally—and most importantly for our purposes—the
officer had no discretion to change the ordered method of execution (for
example, from beheading to hanging, or vice versa): “[F]or he is merely
ministerial, and therefore only justified when he acts under the authority and
compulsion of the law . . . .”99 If anyone violated any of these rules, he would
himself be guilty of murder.100 Even the king lacked the authority to
substitute one method of execution for another, because this would be
imposition of a new punishment—although he could remit part of the
sentence.101
5.

American Adoption of English Common Law Limits on
Punishment Discretion
Americans of the Founding Era were at least as concerned about
constraining governmental punishment discretion as were English common
law thinkers.102 They were acutely aware of the historical struggles to
constrain this discretion, and were determined not to permit the same abuses
96

1 TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE, supra note 82, at 92.
See id. at 178–79.
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See id.
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Id. at 179.
100
See id. at 178–79.
101
See id. at 179.
102
For a detailed discussion of American efforts to constrain governmental power within common
law limits during the revolutionary and founding periods, see John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning
of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1792–
1810 (2008) [hereinafter Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”].
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that had occurred in England.103 For example, when England tried to give an
Admiralty Court criminal jurisdiction over American colonists, Americans
protested that because the Admiralty Court used the civil law procedures, it
was comparable to the Court of Star Chamber. As John Adams wrote: “Can
you recollect the complaints and clamors, which were sounded with such
industry, and supported by such a profusion of learning in law and history,
and such invincible reasoning . . . against the Star-Chamber and High
Commission, and yet remain an advocate for the newly-formed courts of
admiralty in America?”104
Similarly, Anti-Federalists opposed ratification of the United States
Constitution on the ground that it did not require Congress to provide
traditional common law protections to criminal defendants.105 Patrick Henry
noted, for example, that although criminal courts of equity were forbidden
in England, “[Congress] will tell you that there is such a necessity of
strengthening the arm of government, that they must have a criminal equity,
and extort confession by torture, in order to punish with still more relentless
severity. We are then lost and undone.”106
Indeed, many of the rights listed in the original constitutional text and
the Bill of Rights were specifically designed to limit the government’s
discretionary power to punish.107 These include the right to trial by jury in
the state and vicinage of the offense;108 habeas corpus;109 prohibitions of ex
post facto laws and bills of attainder;110 the right to indictment by grand
103

See id. at 1798.
John Adams, The Earl of Clarendon to William Pym, BOS. GAZETTE (Supp.), Jan. 13, 1766,
reprinted in 3 CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES: WITH A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR, NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS 469–70 (Boston, Charles C.
Little & James Brown 1851).
105
See, e.g., GEORGE MASON, OBJECTIONS TO THIS CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT (1787),
reprinted in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 637 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
(“There is no Declaration of Rights, and the laws of the general government being paramount to the laws
and constitution of the several States, the Declaration of Rights in the separate States are no security. Nor
are the people secured even in the enjoyment of the benefit of the common law (which stands here upon
no other foundation than its having been adopted by the respective acts forming the constitutions of the
several States).”).
106
Patrick Henry, Speech to the Virginia Ratifying Convention for the United States Constitution
(June 9, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 9, at 448.
107
The Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution largely to answer the Anti-Federalist critique
that the original constitutional text did not provide sufficient common law constraints on the power of the
federal government. See, e.g., ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776–1791,
at 171–75 (rev. ed. 1983); Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual,”supra note 102, at 1800–08.
108
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; id. art. III, § 2.
109
Id. art. I, § 9.
110
Id. art. I, §§ 9–10.
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jury;111 the prohibition of double jeopardy;112 the prohibition of compelled
self-incrimination;113 the right to due process of law;114 the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;115 the right to be
confronted with the witnesses against him;116 the right to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor;117 the right to have the assistance
of counsel;118 and the prohibition of excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel
and unusual punishments.119
Like its English counterpart, American law required that even where a
decision-maker has discretion as to the type or quantity of punishment, such
discretion must have legal limits.120 For example, the defendant in
Commonwealth v. Wyatt121 was convicted of operating an illegal gaming
table122 and appealed his conviction on the ground that the criminal statute
authorized the judge to inflict a cruel and unusual punishment.123 The statute
provided that a defendant could be imprisoned for up to six months and
“shall moreover be punished with stripes, at the discretion of the Court, to
be inflicted at one time, or at different times during such confinement, as
such Court may direct, provided the same do not exceed thirty-nine at any
one time.”124 Wyatt argued that “the Court, by virtue of this Law, might
exercise its discretion to subserve vindictive passions, and so as to direct the
party convicted to be subjected to thirty-nine stripes every day of the six
months, which would inevitably terminate in death; a death produced by the
most cruel torture.”125 The General Court of Virginia rejected this argument,
noting that the discretion authorized under this statute was “of the same
character with the discretion always exercised by Common Law Courts to
inflict fine and imprisonment, and subject to be restrained by the same
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considerations.”126 If the judge abused this discretion by inflicting excessive
floggings, he could be “impeached” for abuse of office.127
B. The Particular Danger of Executive Discretion over Punishment
Executive officials have strong incentives to impose punishments
without law. A king or a president may wish to use punishment to put a stop
to civil disorder or to dispose of political enemies. Similarly, a prison warden
may wish to inflict punishment to establish order in the prison or to put down
prisoners who challenge or annoy him. Historically, the constitutional
movement to limit punishment discretion has been driven by executive
officials’ attempts to impose punishment without law. It was King John’s
depredations that led to Magna Carta’s requirement that punishment be
according to the “law of the land.”128 It was the unauthorized punishments
imposed by the Court of Star Chamber—a prerogative court composed
largely of the king’s ministers—that led to the emphasis on common law
rights in England and America.129
Both English and American thinkers recognized that executive
discretion over punishment was dangerous because it could lead so easily to
tyranny. For example, the tendency of English kings to impose arbitrary
imprisonment led Parliament to pass the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.130 This
statute strengthened the ancient common law writ of habeas corpus, which
provided for judicial review of the lawfulness of incarceration.131 Blackstone
described the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 as an important structural limit to
royal and executive power:
[I]f once it were left in the power of any, the highest, magistrate to imprison
arbitrarily whomever he or his officers thought proper, (as in France it is daily
practised by the crown) there would soon be an end of all other rights and
126

Id. at 701.
Id.; see also Ex parte Hickey, 12 Miss. (4 S. & M.) 751, 765–66 (1844) (holding that the trial
court’s claim of inherent power to punish newspaper editor for contempt for running an article critical of
the judge was invalid because it gave the judge unlimited power to punish). “It is a maxim of law that
where a discretion is allowed courts in the punishment of defined offen[s]es, that discretion must be
regulated by law. But in this instance, the law, as claimed, sets to itself no bounds, and, under the influence
of strong passions, punishment may be inflicted to a cruel, an unusual and excessive degree.” Hickey,
12 Miss. (4 S. & M.) at 778.
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See, e.g., Breay & Harrison, supra note 80.
129
See, e.g., The Habeas Corpus Act 1640, 16 Car. c. 10 (Eng.); Adams, supra note 104.
130
See Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2 c. 2 (Eng.); see also, e.g., Amanda L. Tyler, A “Second
Magna Carta”: The English Habeas Corpus Act and the Statutory Origins of the Habeas Privilege,
91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1949 (2016) (describing the origins and significance of the Habeas Corpus Act
of 1679).
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See Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2 c. 2 (Eng.).
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immunities . . . . To bereave a man of life, or by violence to confiscate his estate,
without accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious an act of despotism,
as must at once convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the whole kingdom: but
confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to gaol, where his
sufferings are unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, and
therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government. 132

Similarly, Justice Joseph Story wrote that although the President’s duty
to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed” gives the President an
important role in protecting the country’s well-being, it must not be
construed to give him power to impose punishments:
[W]e are not to understand[] that this clause confers on the President any new
and substantial power to cause the laws to be faithfully executed, by any means,
which he shall see fit to adopt, although not prescribed by the Constitution, or
by the acts of Congress. That would be to clothe him with an absolute despotic
power over the lives, the property, and the rights of the whole people. A
tyrannical President might, under a pretence of this sort, punish for a crime,
without any trial by jury, or usurp the functions of other departments of the
government.133

C. Penal Effect and the Line Between Punishment and Regulation
The question of how to draw the line between punishments and
nonpenal regulations has arisen repeatedly from the very beginning of the
republic. In Calder v. Bull,134 for example, the Supreme Court held that a
Connecticut statute enacted to overturn a judge’s decision disapproving a
will was not an ex post facto law, even though it retroactively changed legal
rules in a way that deprived the plaintiff of property, because the law did not
impose a punishment.135 In support of this decision, Justice Samuel Chase
wrote that an ex post facto law is:
1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, and
which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd. Every
law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed.
3rd. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment,
132

1 TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE, supra note 82, at 135–36.
See JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
177–78 (1840).
134
3 U.S. 386 (1798).
135
See id. at 387, 390. There has been sustained controversy from the time Calder was decided to
today as to the correctness of its decision that the Ex Post Facto Clause only applies to criminal and not
civil statutes. See, e.g., John Mikhail, James Wilson, Early American Land Companies, and the Original
Meaning of “Ex Post Facto Law,” 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 79 (2019). This controversy is beyond the
scope of the present Essay.
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than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters
the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the
law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict
the offender.136

The Calder Court held that the Connecticut law did not violate the Ex
Post Facto Clause because it did not impose a punishment—although in
making this decision, the Court did not define “punishment” so as to make
the distinction between penal and nonpenal laws and practices clear.
The distinction between punishment and regulation repeatedly arose in
the nineteenth century in relation to the power to deport noncitizens. The
issue was first debated after passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts in
1798.137 These statutes were enacted during a period of heightened tensions
between the United States and France and gave the President the authority to
arrest and deport such noncitizens “as he shall judge dangerous to the peace
and safety of the United States, or shall have reasonable grounds to suspect
are concerned in any treasonable or secret machinations against the
government thereof,”138 or who are male, fourteen years old or older, and
“natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of [a] hostile nation or government”
during a time of actual conflict.139
The Alien and Sedition Acts generated numerous constitutional
objections. Most notable for our purposes was the Virginia legislature’s
complaint that the deportation provisions gave the President the power to
impose punishments without trial, and therefore “subvert[ed] the general
principles of free government” by “uniting legislative and judicial powers to
those of executive.”140 In response, Congress rejected the argument that the
Alien Acts gave the President the authority to punish without trial, arguing
that deportation was not a punishment “but . . . merely the removal from
motives of general safety, of an indulgence which there is danger of their
abusing, and which we are in no manner bound to grant or continue.”141
136

Calder, 3 U.S. at 390 (emphasis omitted).
See Alien Friends Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798); Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798);
Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
138
Alien Friends Act, 1 Stat. 570.
139
Alien Enemies Act, 1 Stat. 577.
140
JAMES MADISON, VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS OF 1798, PRONOUNCING THE ALIEN AND SEDITION
LAWS TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL, AND DEFINING THE RIGHTS OF THE STATES (1798), reprinted in
4 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787,
at 528 (2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES].
141
REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE PETITIONS PRAYING FOR A REPEAL OF THE ALIEN AND
SEDITION LAWS (1799) [hereinafter SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT], in 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2987 (1851).
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James Madison replied on behalf of the Virginia legislature that deportation
is the same thing as banishment, and that it is therefore a punishment
regardless of whether Congress’s motives were “preventive” or “penal.”142
Because deportation has the effect of removing a person from a country
where he may have made a permanent home, acquired property, and
established friends and family ties and exposing him to the dangers of travel
at sea during a time of possible conflict, Madison argued that it must be
classified as a punishment: “[I]f a banishment of this sort be not a
punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it will be difficult to
imagine a doom to which the name can be applied.”143
This debate did not definitively resolve the constitutionality of the Alien
Acts’ deportation provisions. Nonetheless, it is illuminating because both
sides of the debate focused primarily on the question of whether deportation
has a penal effect. The congressional Committee argued that the Acts were
not a punishment but “merely the removal, from motives of general safety,
of an indulgence.”144 Madison, on the other hand, asserted that deportation of
those who may have lived here for years, formed relationships, acquired
property, and sought citizenship is “banishment,” a traditional method of
punishment.145 He argued that Congress may not use a punishment to achieve
a regulatory purpose unless it complies with the Constitution’s procedural
restrictions on the government’s power to punish. He further argued that the
Executive should not possess independent authority to inflict punishment. 146
The issues raised by the Alien Acts arose once again nearly a century
later in Wong Wing v. United States.147 The defendants in the case were
Chinese citizens convicted under a law providing that any Chinese person
found to be illegally present in the United States should be sentenced to up
142
JAMES MADISON, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO WHOM WERE REFERRED THE
COMMUNICATIONS OF VARIOUS STATES, RELATIVE TO THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE LAST GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF THIS STATE, CONCERNING THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS, H.D. 1799–1800 Sess. (Va.
1800) [hereinafter MADISON, REPORT], reprinted in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 140, at 546, 554–
55.
143
Id.
144
SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 141, at 2987.
145
See MADISON, REPORT, supra note 142; see also, e.g., 4 TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE, supra note 91,
at 112, 121, 138, 187, 245, 376–77 (providing various examples, ancient and modern, in which
banishment is prescribed as a punishment).
146
See MADISON, REPORT, supra note 142, at 568. Nearly a century later, the Supreme Court
concluded that deportation is not the equivalent of banishment because traditionally banishment was only
a punishment for citizens, not aliens. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (“The
order of deportation is not a punishment for crime. It is not a banishment, in the sense in which that word
is often applied to the expulsion of a citizen from his country by way of punishment.”).
147
163 U.S. 228 (1896).
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to a year of imprisonment at hard labor followed by deportation.148 The
defendants were convicted in a summary hearing before a commissioner149
and sentenced to sixty days at hard labor in a house of correction before
deportation.150 They argued that imprisonment at hard labor is an infamous
punishment within the meaning of the Constitution, and that therefore they
had been unconstitutionally denied their rights to indictment by grand jury
and to a jury trial.151 The Supreme Court agreed, noting that “for more than
a century[,] imprisonment at hard labor in the state prison or penitentiary or
other similar institution has been considered an infamous punishment in
England and America.”152 The fact that Congress’s purposes were regulatory
did not prevent the statute from being subject to the constitutional limits on
punishment: “[W]hen Congress sees fit to further promote such a policy by
subjecting the persons of such aliens to infamous punishment at hard labor,
or by confiscating their property, we think such legislation, to be valid, must
provide for a judicial trial to establish the guilt of the accused.”153
The question of the line between punishment and nonpenal regulation
also arose in the context of the late nineteenth-century trend (which persists
to this day)154 toward housing condemned offenders awaiting execution in
solitary confinement in the state penitentiary.155 This trend seems not to have
been intended to further any penal purpose; rather, it appears to have been
motivated by the desire to hide executions from public view.156 For most of
the nineteenth century—indeed, for nearly all of history—executions were
148

Id. at 233–34.
Id. at 229.
150
Id. at 234.
151
Id.
152
Id. at 237.
153
Id.
154
See Marah Stith McLeod, Does the Death Penalty Require Death Row? The Harm of Legislative
Silence, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 525, 527 (2016).
155
See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF
ABOLITION 52, 116 (2010) (describing the historical trend toward moving executions out of the public
square and into the private confines of the prison).
156
See, e.g., STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 148 (2002) (noting
that in nineteenth-century America, many criticized public executions on the ground that they generated
public sympathy for offenders); GARLAND, supra note 155, at 135 (stating that moving executions out of
public view “is best viewed as the ongoing effort of government officials to exert ever-tighter control
over a fraught undertaking and to manage the meanings that it put into circulation”); LOUIS P. MASUR,
RITES OF EXECUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE,
1776–1865, at 96 (1989) (describing the perception among some nineteenth-century elites that public
executions undermined public order); Michael Madow, Forbidden Spectacle: Executions, the Public and
the Press in Nineteenth Century New York, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 461, 493–97 (1995) (describing debate
among historians concerning the reasons executions were moved out of the public square).
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conducted in the public square.157 Toward the end of the nineteenth century,
a number of states moved executions out of the public square and behind
prison walls.158 This move was supported by some people who believed that
public executions coarsened public sensibility by turning death into a
spectacle.159 But there is evidence that states were actually motivated by a
desire to undercut the death penalty abolition movement by removing
executions from public view and thus minimizing the emotional force of the
abolitionist argument.160
The Colorado statute considered by the Supreme Court in the case In re
Medley is a good example of these new death penalty statutes.161 In 1889,
Colorado adopted a new law governing executions in the state. The old law
had provided that prisoners awaiting execution should be kept in a county
jail for fifteen to twenty-five days before execution by hanging.162 Both the
jail term and the execution were supervised by the county sheriff.163 The new
law, by contrast, required that a prisoner sentenced to death be kept in
solitary confinement in the state penitentiary for two to four weeks prior to
execution.164 The execution should be “enclosed from public view within the
walls of the penitentiary.”165 The warden had the power to set the time and
date of the execution, but was required to keep this information “secret” from
everyone except those people invited to witness the execution.166 These
witnesses were also required to keep the time and date of the execution
secret.167 All witnesses were also prohibited from divulging the details of
what happened at the execution “beyond the statement of the fact that such
convict was on the day in question duly executed according to law at the state
penitentiary.”168 Thus, under the new Colorado statute, the offender was kept
in solitary confinement in a location likely to be remote from the place of
157

See, e.g., JOHN D. BESSLER, DEATH IN THE DARK: MIDNIGHT EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 25 (1997)
(noting that executions in early America were designed to encourage public visibility); GARLAND, supra
note 155, at 52, 116.
158
See, e.g., GARLAND, supra note 155, at 116.
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See BANNER, supra note 156, at 146, 153; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 76 (1993); MASUR, supra note 156, at 97.
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See, e.g., BANNER, supra note 156, at 148; GARLAND, supra note 155, at 135; MASUR, supra note
156, at 97; Madow, supra note 156, at 491, 557.
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134 U.S. 160 (1890).
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Id. at 167.
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crime and conviction; neither the offender nor the public was to be informed
of the execution’s time and place; the execution took place behind prison
walls; and the details of the execution—including, for example, the suffering
undergone by the offender—were to be kept secret as well.169 The whole
focus of the statute was on isolation and secrecy.
An offender named James Medley challenged the constitutionality of
this statute. Medley committed a murder in May of 1889, two months before
Colorado adopted its new execution law.170 Medley was tried and convicted
after adoption of the new execution law and was sentenced under its
provisions.171 He challenged his conviction on the ground that the new law
imposed an ex post facto punishment in violation of Article I, Section Ten
of the United States Constitution.172 He argued that the imposition of solitary
confinement in a state penitentiary—albeit only for a period of two to four
weeks—substantially added to the pain and suffering of his execution.173
Because the new statute imposed additional punishment, and because it was
adopted after Medley committed his crime, it violated the constitutional
prohibition of ex post facto punishments.174
The Supreme Court agreed.175 It held that placing the prisoner in solitary
confinement prior to execution added so much suffering to the execution that
it had to be considered an additional punishment for constitutional
purposes.176 Thus, the new statute could not be applied to a prisoner whose
crime occurred before the statute took effect without violating the prohibition
of ex post facto punishments.177 In reaching this decision, the Court took note
of both England’s and America’s prior experience with solitary confinement.
During the reign of George II, the English Parliament authorized solitary
confinement prior to execution in order to add “further terror and [a] peculiar
mark of infamy” to the sentence.178 But Parliament repealed this law during
the reign of William IV because “[i]n Great Britain, as in other countries,
public sentiment revolted against this severity.”179 Similarly, the Court noted,
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America had experimented with solitary confinement earlier in the
nineteenth century and found it unduly harsh:
[E]xperience demonstrated that there were serious objections to it. A
considerable number of the prisoners fell, after even a short confinement, into
a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to impossible to arouse them,
and others became violently insane; others, still, committed suicide; while those
who stood the ordeal better were not generally reformed, and in most cases did
not recover sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the
community . . . . [S]ome thirty or forty years ago the whole subject attracted the
general public attention, and its main feature of solitary confinement was found
to be too severe.180

Given the fact that solitary confinement was historically used as a
heightened form of punishment, and given its extremely harsh effects, the
Supreme Court held that it could not be considered a mere administrative
measure. Rather, it was “an additional punishment of the most important and
painful character.”181 Thus, Medley’s punishment violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause, and Medley’s conviction had to be overturned—even though this
meant that Medley would escape punishment for murder altogether.182
In sum, the United States Constitution is designed to limit the discretion
of government officials—including executive officials—to impose
punishments. Under the Constitution, the line between punishments and
nonpenal regulations is determined primarily by examining the penal effect
of the government’s action. If the government employs a method that has
traditionally been considered a punishment—such as banishment or
imprisonment in a penitentiary—it is to be classified as a punishment even
if the government’s asserted purpose is regulatory rather than penal.
Similarly, if the government imposes conditions that increase the harshness
of the offender’s suffering beyond what could reasonably be considered part
of an offender’s sentence, it is a new punishment, as the Medley Court
concluded in the context of solitary confinement.
III. HISTORY AND EFFECTS OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT
As the above discussion demonstrates, the Supreme Court’s current
treatment of the decision to place an offender in solitary confinement as an
administrative matter rather than a punishment conflicts directly with its
previous holding that solitary confinement is a punishment for constitutional
180
181
182

38
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purposes.183 Astonishingly, up to now, the Court has not shown any
awareness of the conflict.
Resolving this conflict is important because most states today impose
solitary confinement without statutory authorization. According to Professor
Alexander Reinert, only four states—Delaware, Washington, South
Carolina, and Pennsylvania—have statutes authorizing the use of solitary
confinement outside the context of death row, and three states—Idaho,
Pennsylvania, and Wyoming—have statutes authorizing it for those under a
sentence of death.184 This means that the vast majority of prisoners subjected
to solitary confinement are sent there by prison officials without statutory
authorization, based solely on their authority to administer prisons. If solitary
confinement is a punishment, this conduct is unconstitutional.
Before reaching a final conclusion concerning how to resolve this
conflict, this Essay will look briefly at the history and effects of solitary
confinement to determine whether the Medley Court’s findings concerning
its extreme harshness are correct.
A. Solitary Confinement in Nineteenth-Century America
Solitary confinement has a long and troubled history in the United
States. It was introduced by eighteenth- and nineteenth-century reformers
who wished to reduce use of the death penalty, corporal punishments, and
shaming punishments. The reformers argued that imprisonment and solitary
confinement would operate as more effective and humane engines of
rehabilitation.185 Some reformers believed that solitary confinement could
transform offenders into peaceful and productive members of society by
segregating them from harmful outside influences and providing time for

183
Compare, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 213 (2005), with Medley, 134 U.S. at 171.
Interestingly, several courts have held that judges lack the authority to impose solitary confinement as
part of an offender’s sentence where it is not explicitly authorized by penal statute. See, e.g., State v.
McHenry, 525 N.W.2d 620, 627 (Neb. 1995) (invalidating sentence of four days per year in solitary
confinement due to lack of statutory authorization); Fludd v. Goldberg, 854 N.Y.S.2d 362, 367 (App.
Div. 2008) (same); State v. Snitzky, Nos. 74706, 74811, 1998 WL 827611, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998)
(same). These cases appear to recognize the same truth the Medley Court did—solitary confinement is an
additional punishment above and beyond a mere prison sentence.
184
See Reinert, supra note 3, at 959–60.
185
See, e.g., ADAM JAY HIRSCH, THE RISE OF THE PENITENTIARY 19 (1992) (describing reformers’
arguments for the institution of solitary confinement); Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons
of the Future: A Psychological Analysis of Supermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 477, 482 (1997) (same); see generally David M. Shapiro, Solitary Confinement in the
Young Republic, 133 HARV. L. REV. 542 (2019) (describing the early history of solitary confinement in
America).
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reflection and prayer.186 Others believed that the “terror” induced by solitary
confinement would deter crime.187 Led by Pennsylvania and New York, a
number of states created penitentiaries in the nineteenth century and
amended their penal statutes to provide for imprisonment and solitary
confinement.188
Although solitary confinement enjoyed a period of popularity over
several decades in the nineteenth century, it came into disrepute as its effects
became known.189 Experience showed that solitary confinement did not serve
to rehabilitate prisoners; rather, it destroyed them.190 Numerous cases of
hallucination, insanity, despair, suicide, illness, and death were reported by
prison administrators and outside observers.191 Writers such as Alexis de
Tocqueville, Gustave Beaumont, and Charles Dickens, who observed
prisoners subject to solitary confinement, described its effects as “fatal”192
and “worse than any torture.”193 Thus, solitary confinement fell out of favor

186

See Haney & Lynch, supra note 185.
See, e.g., WILLIAM PALEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 436
(Boston, Joshua Belcher, 7th ed. 1811) (discussing the potential deterrent effect of the “terror” induced
by solitary confinement).
188
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189
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G. DE BEAUMONT & A. DE TOQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES
AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE 5 (Francis Lieber trans., 1833) (“This trial, from which so happy a
result had been anticipated, was fatal to the greater part of the convicts: in order to reform them, they had
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CHARLES DICKENS, AMERICAN NOTES FOR GENERAL CIRCULATION 123–24 (Paris, A. & W.
Galignani & Co. 1842) (“I hold this slow and daily tampering with the mysteries of the brain, to be
immeasurably worse than any torture of the body . . . .”). Hans Christian Andersen similarly described
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as a method of punishment by the 1860s and largely disappeared from the
United States by the 1870s and 1880s.194
B. Late Twentieth-Century Resurgence of Solitary Confinement
Long-term solitary confinement experienced a resurgence starting in
the 1960s and 1970s before drastically accelerating with the rise of supermax
prisons in the 1980s and 1990s.195 By 2004, forty-four states and the District
of Columbia had joined the federal government in opening supermax
facilities.196 According to recent estimates by the Liman Center at Yale Law
School, more than 60,000 offenders are currently housed in solitary
confinement.197 Of these, approximately 11,500 have spent a year or more in
solitary, and nearly 3,000 have spent six years or more in solitary.198
The conditions of solitary confinement vary from facility to facility, but
the supermax unit at the Pelican Bay penitentiary in California, as described
by the court in Madrid v. Gomez, is fairly representative.199 At the time
Madrid was decided, most prisoners in the secure housing unit (SHU) at
Pelican Bay were kept in total isolation, twenty-four hours per day, seven
days per week.200 Each prisoner spent about twenty-three hours per day in a
cell approximately the size of a parking spot.201 For about an hour each day,
the prisoner would be let into a caged exercise area, resembling a dog run,
where he was permitted to exercise alone.202 Meals were served through a
solitary confinement he witnessed in a Swedish prison as “a well-built machine—a nightmare for the
spirit.” HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, PICTURES OF SWEDEN 56 (London, Richard Bentley, 2d ed. 1852).
194
See, e.g., Rubin & Reiter, supra note 188, at 1617; Shapiro, supra note 185, at 572. Shorter-term
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there is evidence that some prison officials subjected some prisoners to extended periods in solitary
confinement. See, e.g., Stinneford, Experimental Punishments, supra note 190, at 65–68.
195
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196
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197
REFORMING RESTRICTIVE HOUSING, supra note 2, at 4. A recent study indicates that the rapid
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in the length of time individual prisoners are subjected to it. See Ryan T. Sakoda & Jessica T. Simes,
Solitary Confinement and the U.S. Prison Boom, CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. (Dec. 29, 2019),
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0887403419895315 [https://perma.cc/K9BE-S4EK].
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slot in the door.203 Prisoners were shackled during all interactions with
guards.204 Any meetings with visitors were conducted through thick glass
windows—but such visits were rare because of the prison’s isolated
location.205 In sum, as the former warden testified, imprisonment in the SHU
amounted to “virtual total deprivation, including, insofar as possible,
deprivation of human contact.”206 Numerous supermax facilities share the
characteristics described above.207
C. Current Evidence Concerning the Effects of Solitary Confinement
For purposes of determining whether solitary confinement is a
punishment or a mere administrative action, the key question is this: How
harsh are the effects of solitary confinement in comparison to the effects of
imprisonment generally? Numerous studies of the effects of solitary
confinement have been performed over the past forty years.208 They show
that solitary confinement has extraordinarily harmful effects on prisoners
subjected to it.209 More importantly for our purposes, they show that the
harmful effects of solitary confinement are extreme, not just as an absolute
matter, but also in comparison to the effects of imprisonment generally.
Suffering in prison seems to follow a curve. Studies have shown that
prisoners at the beginning of their sentence tend to experience very high
levels of depression and anxiety.210 But these symptoms tend to recede as
time goes on, so that several years into a term of incarceration, prisoners’
happiness levels generally settle somewhere near their pre-incarceration
baseline.211 This curve corresponds to the theory of “hedonic adaptation,”
which refers to the general human tendency to revert back to a baseline level
of happiness after a significantly positive or negative experience.212
203
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Suffering in solitary confinement follows a very different trajectory.
Studies show that inmate well-being is significantly harmed by solitary
confinement, and harms get worse over time.213 Effects include “extreme
forms of psychopathology,”214 and include suicidal thoughts, hallucinations,
perceptual distortions, violent fantasies, talking to one’s self, overall
deterioration, mood swings, emotional flatness, chronic depression, social
withdrawal, confused thought processes, oversensitivity to stimuli, irrational
anger, and ruminations.215
Compared to the symptoms displayed by prisoners subjected to
incarceration generally, the effects of solitary are extraordinarily grave. For
example, a recent study compared the psychological well-being of prisoners
who had been held in the Secure Housing Unit (SHU) of the Pelican Bay
state prison in California for ten years or more to prisoners held in the general
population of the same prison for a comparable period of time.216 The study
213
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reviews: Bruce A. Arrigo & Jennifer Leslie Bullock, The Psychological Effects of Solitary Confinement
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flawed as to be meaningless. See, e.g., Stuart Grassian & Terry A. Kupers, The Colorado Study vs. the
Reality of Supermax Confinement, 13 CORRECTIONAL MENTAL HEALTH REP. 1, 7–8 (2011) (noting that,
among other problems, the study ignored key data, including the fact that the prisons recorded almost
seven times as many psychiatric emergencies per inmate in solitary confinement than among those in the
general population); Craig Haney, The Psychological Effects of Solitary Confinement: A Systematic
Critique, 47 CRIME & JUST. 365, 369–70 (2018) (noting flaws including contamination of treatment and
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excluded prisoners listed on the prison’s mental health caseload,217 and
prisoners from both groups were randomly selected.218 It found that extreme
long-term SHU prisoners reported nearly twice the number of stress-related
trauma and isolation-related pathology symptoms as prisoners in the general
population,219 and much greater intensity of stress, trauma, and isolationrelated pathology symptoms.220 Finally, the study found that “the prisoners
in long-term solitary confinement were not only significantly more lonely
than the long-term GP prisoners . . . but also reported extremely high levels
of loneliness rarely found anywhere in the literature.”221 Similar results have
been found by other comparative studies.222 There is broad consensus that
placing a prisoner in solitary has a psychological and physical impact well
above any that a prisoner would experience in general population.
In sum, historical and modern empirical evidence concerning the effects
of solitary confinement strongly support the Supreme Court’s conclusion in
In re Medley that solitary confinement is an additional punishment within
the meaning of the United States Constitution. It causes suffering and harm
well beyond that caused by a general sentence of imprisonment. Moreover,
unlike the suffering caused by imprisonment generally, the suffering
continues to intensify over time. Because solitary confinement is an
additional punishment, its imposition does not fall within the legitimate
discretion of prison officials seeking to promote prison security. Rather,
before it may be imposed, it must be authorized by the penal statute
governing the offense of conviction in effect at the time the prisoner
committed his crime and must be imposed as part of the offender’s sentence.
CONCLUSION
Solitary confinement is a punishment. The Supreme Court was correct
when it reached this conclusion in 1890, and more recent cases ignoring this
conclusion are incorrect. When a prison official inflicts solitary confinement
on a prisoner without prior statutory and sentencing authorization, that
official imposes a “punishment without law.” Basic principles of separation
of powers and individual rights dictate that this practice must stop.
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